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First, Respondent refers to a "Vital Information Statement" that they refer to as a
"business record" of the Association. They argue the unrecorded, unsigned "Vital Information
Statement" applies to both Phase I and Phase II and was signed by each buyer in Phase I and II.
Responden t's Brief, pp.1-2.
There is scant evidence to suggest that the document is admissible as a "business record"
There is no evidence in the record of the Vital Information Statement ever having been signed,
nor being recorded. Likewise, the document content, if admissible, has no bearing on the legal
issues before the court. Furthermore, the document references Phase I and was not recorded
against the properties in Phase I or Phase II, thereby having little to no relevance. R. Vol. I,
pp.165-170.
Second, the Appellants in this matter are all of the owners of the Phase II properties. The
Phase I ownership consists of eleven ( 11) parcels, all of whom voted in favor of the illegal
assessment to pave the roadway through Phase I. Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Teresa Zirwes
filed February 24, 2014, Ex. 6 and Ex. 8, p.3, Recital 12.
Furthermore, the owners in Phase I voted to disproportionately levy the paving
assessment (41 % thereof) upon the Appellants and their four (4) parcels in Phase II based on
distance from Baldy Road. This vote was also done while not allowing the owners of Phase II
(Appellants) to vote until the Appellants paid prior years' assessments. The Appellants contend
the prior years' assessments were illegal, exceeding Association authority to increase annual
assessments. R. Vol. II, pp.369-379.

II
Aside

31,

the handwritten references that appear to be

unrelated to the document itself, the amendment, signed by the Appellants T.T. LLC and Farner,
simply restricts further subdivision of the Phase II parcels.
or signature by

amendment contains no approval

Phase I Association or membership, a further reflection of the Association's

limited powers as pertains to Phase II.
Fourth, Respondent's Brief suggests the Statement of the Case in Respondent's Brief
suggests that the parties stipulated to facts by filing Cross-Summa ry Judgment Motions. This is
not supported by the transcript.
At the July 9, 2014 summary judgment hearings, the follo,ving colloquy occurred:
COURT:

MR. REED:

.... And I also wonder are you - are we in
agreement that since we've got cross
motions for summary judgment that
basically that the Court's going to decide
this as a matter of law? So thoughts on that
as well. I mean, since you're -- you're -each asking me to grant summary judgment,
I don't know if-- we may be saying there
aren't really any disputed facts.
I think, Your Honor, that is entirely correct.
The basic facts are not in dispute in our
motion. In our brief, we responded to,
except what Attorney Featherston had said
in his brief, was that this was a cross motion
for summary judgment and all the facts are
in dispute.
Now, what might be the facts might be in
dispute but there's no - there's no question
in mind that this is something that is a pure
document kind of situation with no need for
witnesses or trial or anything like that.

pp.
At no time did Appellants stipulate to facts in response to the Court's inquiry. Instead,
both Counsel argued the disputed matter of whether or not the Phase II CC&Rs provide the
Association authority to assess and lien Appellant's property.
The Trial Court was required to evaluate each party's motion on its own merit.
Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 605, 338 P.3d 1204, 1209
(2014).
Respondent's Brief asserts that "the underlying basis for each of the [defendant's]
counterclaims and third party claims was that POVE HOA did not have the authority to assess and
enforce liens against the Defendants' respective properties for the purpose of road paving."
Respondent's Brief, p.6. This is partially correct, but in fact, the Answer and Counterclaim filed by
the Defendants sought relief beyond that pointing out that: 1) the liens, as filed, were defective as
they did not accurately reflect the Association's corporate entity; 2) that the notices of claim ofliens
was a slander of title as filed ofrecord prior to the filing of the litigation; 3) Appellants sought
declaratory judgment and quiet title determining the nature, scope and extent of the Association's
power and authority to assess liens

the future and in regard to past assessments or liens including

those wl:1ich were at issue in the Plaintiff's Complaint; and, 4) Appellants sought preliminary and
permanent injunction directing the Association to cease and desist further or future activity contrary
to Association authority. R. Vol.II, pp.369-378.
Lastly, the Respondent's Statement of Facts appears to misconstrue what is before the Court
on appeal. Procedurally speaking, the Plaintiff and Defendants' Cross-Motions

3

Summary

a

uoi:nnem: were
to Reconsider,

1\/l,>mn,-r,:,n,h

or Amend Memorandum Decision was

Defendants/Appellants on August 6, 2014. Although the time period for filing a Notice of Appeal
was arguably stayed by the Motion, the Appellants, nonetheless, timely filed their Notice of Appeal,
September 2, 2014, from the Court's Memorandum Decision. R. Vol.II, pp.380-385.

Court

then heard the Appellants' Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend and issued its Memorandum
Decision and Order on January 20, 2015. R. Vol.ill, pp.512-525. Appellants filed their Second
Amended Notice of Appeal on January 27, 2015, timely appealing the Court's Memorandum
Decision and Order and Amended Judgment both issued January 20, 2015. R. Vol.Ill, pp.530-538.
As a result of the timely Notice of Appeal and Amended Second Notice of Appeal, the
Responden t's assertion is incon-ect that it does not appear that Appellants have appealed the Court's
Memorand um Decision or the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-

8.

"do not appear to

the

preliminary statement of issues contained in their multiple Notices of Appeal". Respondent's Brief,
p.7
Idaho Appellate Rule l 7(f) provides that a Notice of Appeal should contain a "preliminary
statement of the issues on appeal" but further states that "any such list of issues on appeal shall not
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal." I.A.R. 17(£)(2015)
The issues presented on appeal in Appellants' opening Brief fairly reflect the issues raised
before the Trial Court in the July 14, 2014 Motion(s) for Summary Judgment, and, again in the
December, 2014 Motions to Reconsider. The issues are all timely before this Court on appeal as
reflected in the Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. There should be no confusion as
to the issues. To suggest otherwise is simply to obfuscate the issues before the Court.

5

of
On this issue, the Respondent's Statement of the Standard of Review is generally
accurate, as this is an appeal from decisions on motions for summary judgment. As quoted
above, the Court is required to evaluate each party's motion

summary judgment on its own

merit. Appellants respectfully suggest that the District Court failed to do so in this instance and
thereby overlooked the variety of the issues raised by Appellants' Answer to Amended
Complaint, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint or in their CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend.

B.

The Association's authority is limited as a matter of law by its operative
documents, and in the case of Phase II owners, Phase II CC&Rs.

Section B of the Respondent's Brief appears to intentionally sidestep the issues presented by
Appellants' on appeal. The Association restates provisions ofidaho Code § 45-810 in an effort to
bootstrap its authority beyond that which is provided in the corporate charter or operative
documents (Articles and By-laws) and Phase II CC&Rs.
There are in this instance two (2) separate issues that must be considered:
First, what is the extent of the Association's corporate power as set forth in its corporate
documents? And, second, what is the Association's powers for assessment in regard to the Phase II
property owners (Appellants in this matter) as set forth in

recorded Phase II CC&Rs and as

allowed under Idaho Code§ 45-810?

1.

The Corporation's Powers under the corporate documents.

While a corporation is granted authority to accomplish its lawful
purposes, a corporation's power to act must be construed by

6

of

reference to

114

In a case involving somewhat similar issues concerning a homeowner's association
powers, the Supreme Court noted as follows:
In order to resolve these issues, we must construe the bylaws.
Because corporate documents are equivalent to contracts among
the members of the association, the normal rules governing the
interpretation of contracts apply. Tue objective in interpreting
contracts is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.
The intent of the parties should, if possible, be ascertained from
the language of the document The determination of a contract's
meaning and legal effect is a question of law when the contract is
clear and unambiguous.
Twin Lakes Village Property Association, Inc. v. Crowley,
124 Idaho 132,135,857 P.2d 611,614 (1993)[emphasis added]
In this case, the Articles of Incorporation of Pend Oreille View Estates Owners'
Association, Inc. are attached as Exhibit 4 to the Affidavit of Teresa Zirwes filed February 24,
2014. Notably, the Articles contain only a legal description of the properties in Phase I, not
Phase IL For this reason, the Association is, indeed, a "Phase I Association" with limited powers
over Phase II owners. The Phase II CC&Rs confirm this by referencing the Association as
"Phase I Owner's Association". Phase II CC&Rs, §2.
Article IV of the Articles provides that the Association has only the powers and purposes
that may be "in accordance with the Bylaws duly adopted by the corporation and those certain
Covenants, Conditions and Restricts as from time to time amended, (the Declaration) recorded in
the office of the Recorder, Bonner County, Idaho as Instrument Nos. 449457

7

amended by

Zirwes,
Article IV concludes by specifying the Association's powers as those that are set forth in
the Phase I Declaration (CC&Rs) and the Bylaws and also specifying the Association's powers to
"fix, levy, collect and enforce the assessments and

as may

set forth in the Declarations

and Bylaws". Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit ofTeresaZirwes, Exhibit 4, Article IV, p.3.
As discussed in Appellants' opening brief, the Phase I CC&Rs and Bylaws, consistently,
and without exception, limit the Association's corporate powers to that of maintenance.
Phase I CC&Rs reference maintenance only in the following instances: Section 2.04(d)
[the Association has the right and power to contract for .... the maintenance and repair of the
private roads .... ]; Section 3.04

said rights of way on private roads maintained for the use and

benefit of the tract owners .... " Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Defendants/Crossclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed
June 11, 2014, Exhibit B, P. 3-4. [underline added]
Likewise, the Bylaws § 3 .02.1 contain only the following references to corporate powers
regard to the roads.
l)

Subsection c permits Phase II owners to cast votes on
questions "which relate directly to the common access road
through Phase I property ... which common access roadway
the Association has authority and responsibility to
maintain";

1

Instrument No. 449457 are the Phase I CC&Rs. Instrument No. 459222 is an a1nendment to
the Phase I CC&Rs to exclude a small portion of Section 7 from Phase I that would later be part
of the Phase II CC&Rs and owned by Appellants Farner. Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Counsel
in Support ofDefendants/Counterclaimants/Third-Party Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C".

8

Subsection d allows assessments "so long as the
assessments in question are proposed to be a charge against
casting
. Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit

Neither the Bylaws nor Articles of Incorporation are recorded instruments which is a
prerequisite to recordation and enforcement of liens under the Idaho Code § 45-810.
This circumstance supports the Appellants position that nothing of record provided notice
or reasonable expectations that the Phase I Association would exercise powers to impose a
paving assessment upon their properties at the time of purchase in 1995 and 1996. Mr. Farner' s
Affidavit reflects his expectation and negotiation with the developer to avoid this result. R. Vol.
II, pp. 364-66. The District Court erred in striking the Affidavit of Mr. Farner as inadmissible
hearsay.
This also complies with the concept that such notice by recordation is required as appears
to be the intent behind Idaho Code §45-810. In any regard, the corporate documents do not
permit broad authority to impose assessments on Phase II for improvement to the roads in Phase
L The Respondent Association is provided absolutely no legal authority to buttress its argument
to the contrary.

2.

Association authority under Idaho Code § 45-810 and Phase

CC&Rs.

Contrary to the Respondent's briefing, there is no issue about whether the Association
generally meets the statutory "definition of a homeowners' association" as contemplated in Idaho
Code§ 458-810. Respondent's Brief, p.9.
The prerequisite for a homeowners' association under Idaho Code§ 45-810 is minimal, but
significant under the facts of this case. A homeowners' association may be an incorporated or an
unincorporated entity in which membership is based on owning or possessing an interest in real

9

§

10.

legislature's Statement of Purpose associated with Idaho Code § 45-810 indicates that
Idaho lacked specific statutory authority authorizing homeowner associations to enforce
assessments. The statutory authority was adopted in 2002, but authority is premised on a recorded
instrument granting power to assess and record liens.
In this case, the only recorded instrument encumbering the Phase II properties and
authorizing such lien power are the Phase II CC&Rs. As discussed in the opening brief, the Phase
II CC&Rs severely curtail the Association power to only matters pertaining directly to maintenance
of the roadways, while simultaneously granting the right to improve roadways to individual lot
owners. Phase II CC&Rs §§ 2.03 and 2.04.
Beyond that, the Respondent's Brief fails to address the lack of Association authority for the
road paving special assessment or the distinction between maintenance and improvements.
Respondents also do not address Appellants' challenge to post annual assessments in excess of
Association authority. Appellants' Brief, pp. 21-25.
For the reasons set forth in Appellants' opening brief and which are unrebutted by
Respondent's Brief, the trial court erred in its decision that the Association was appropriately
empowered under the Articles, Bylaws and recorded Phase II CC&Rs to assess Phase II for the road
paving improvement. The trial court's erroneous decision must therefore reverse and remand with
instruction to enter Summary Judgment in favor of Appellants.

10

Beginning at page 12 of the Respondent's Brief, the Association argues that there is no
distinction between paving and improvement and that the District Court's ruling in that regard
should be affirmed.
Specifically, Respondent quotes the Court Memorandum Decision as follows:
Nowhere in the CC&Rs or Bylaws is there a distinction made
between road maintenance and improvement with respect to the
Association's obligation for road maintenance and the Court
declines to imply from the use of the word in another context a
distinction between road maintenance and improvement with
respect to the Association where none exists anywhere else in the
CC&Rs. The Court finds the CC&Rs consistently and
unambiguously set out the obligation of the Association for the
maintenance of the access roads to and from the county road and
that the paving of the road was within the scope of this obligation.
R. Vol.III, p.524; Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14
This finding is patently false. The Phase II CC&R's do distinguish between improvement
and maintenance.
Section 2.04 Limitation on Powers contains a contextual distinction from the preceding
Section 2.03 Powers of the Association. The District Court failed to address this distinction
asserting that none existed. In Section 2.04, the Declarant states that the Association has no
power to maintain roads in Phase II. Further, this section delegates the power to maintain roads
in Phase II to the owners in Phase II. Section 2.04 states that the limitations do not affect the
Association's authority to "maintain said access roads on property outside the boundaries" of
Phase II, which provide access to county roads. Additionally, it specifies that 0\\11ers retain the
right to "improve" the roads adjacent to their tracts:

u

ability individual owners
Neither shall this limitation impair
portion of the road
to
described
lots herein
3.04].
property owned by
assessments
not
against owners Phase II except such assessments as pertain
directly to the maintenance of roads as referred to in the CC&Rs
recorded as Instrument No. 449457, records of Bonner County,
Idaho require said Association to maintain.
Clerk's Record, Affidavit of Counsel in Support
of Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs'
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D, p.4, Section 2.04
"[TJhe court will not extend by implication any restriction not clearly expressed in a
recorded covenant." Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664,667
(2003). The District Court erred in this case by extending the definition of maintenance to
include improvement by paving the road.
The Respondent's position seems to be that the Court was correct in disregarding the
Declarai,t' s specific distinction between maintenance and improvement powers and that
maintenance and improvements are interchangeable terms. But, given the restrictive rules for
interpretation of covenants, the Court must address the precise language of Section 2.04 of the
Phase II CC&Rs and the declarant' s use of distinctive terms, duties and rights between
Association and Owner and between maintenance and improvement. The manner in which the
Court must interpret the terms of Sections 2.03 and 2.04 is spelled out in Idaho Case law:
Words or phrases that have established definitions in common use
or settled legal meanings are not rendered ambiguous merely
because they are not defined in the document where they are used.
Rather, a covenant is ambiguous when it is capable of more than
one reasonable interpretation on a given issue.
Pinehaven Planning Board, 138 Idaho at 829;
Quoting City of Chub bock v. City of Pocatello,
127 Idaho 198,201,899 P.2d 411,414 (1995)
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terms
Phase II

as used

are interchangeable,

0.~,.u,F,

of POVE's obligations, there is simply no distinction betvveen 'maintenance' and
'improvements"'. Respondent's Brief, p.13.

In the instant case, neither the CC&Rs nor Bylaws provide specific definitions for the
terms "improvement" or "maintenance". As noted in Pinehaven, this is not dispositive of the
issue. Pinehaven requires the Court to determine the legal or common usage definitions of the
tem1s "maintenance" and "improvement".

1.

Legal Meanings

When looking for common usage, Black's Law Dictionary defines improvement as "a
valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than
mere repairs or replacement, costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or
utility, or to adapt it for new or further purposes." Black's Law, 5th Ed. It further defines
improvement as "an expenditure to extend the useful life of an asset or to improve its
performance over that of the original asset" and refers the reader to "contrast with maintenance
and repair".
By contrast, Black's defines maintenance of assets to

"expenditures undertaken to

preserve an asset's service potential for its originally-intended life" and defines maintenance as
the "act of maintaining" or upkeep or preserving the condition of the property to be operated.
Applying the Pinehaven standard of utilizing common usage of the terminology makes
clear that Respondent's position that the terms improvement

maintenance are interchange-

Law Dictionary indicates

able is

13

terms are to be

are

"'-'"'=•u"'"""

Usage

"In construing a deed, the Court should seek to give effect to the intention of the
parties. To determine the intent of the parties, the contract or other writing must be viewed as a
whole and in

entirety." Daughertv v. Post Falls Hw:y. DisL 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534,

538 (2000).
The Declarant' s usage of the terms in the Phase II CC&Rs clearly contemplates a
distinction between the terms as reflected in Sections 2.03 and 2.04 in which the Association's
powers are limited to maintenance without exception, while adjoining owners are granted
authority to improve roads.
Applying Responden t's argument that the terms maintenance and improvement are
interchangeable, as found in the Phase II CC&Rs, requires the Court to disregard Declarant's
intent and the language of Sections 2.03 and 2.04 of the Phase II CC&Rs. It is clear the
Declarant intended to distinguish the two (2) terms.
"Usage or custom is admissible to ascertain the intention of the parties in reference to
matters about which the contract is silent." James Cool DDS v. Mountain View Landowners CoOp Association. Inc., 139 Idaho 770, 773, 86 P.3d 484,487 (2004). However, extrinsic evidence
is only necessary if the intent cannot be determined from the context of the Covenant itself.
"Where a deed is ambiguous, interpretation of the grantor's intent is a question of fact
determined from the instrument itself, as well as from the surrounding facts and circumstances."
C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001).

court
resort to extrinsic

case, the Declarant

consistently referred to maintenance of roads in Phase I as being an obligation of the Association,
while Section 2.04 grants owners the right to improve the roadway on their parcels.
This use of the terms improvement and maintenance as separate and distinct activities
within Sections 2.03 and 2.04 indicate the Declarant's intent that the terms are not
interchangeable but distinct.
The District Court erred in its conclusion that the two terms are interchangeable and the
Respondent's assertion to the contrary is unsupported by the evidence.
In addition, it is evident from reading Section 2.03 of Phase II CC&Rs that Declarant
intended to limit Association powers over Phase II owners.
Respondent's Brief suggests that Appellants have argued the operative documents are
ambiguous. This is not accurate. Appellants maintain that 2.03 and 2.04 are unambiguous when
read in its entirety by distinguishing between maintenance and improvement. The Court failed to
make that distinction, thereby impermissibly increasing the Association powers over Phase II
ovvners.
Trial Court stated that it "declines to imply from the use of the word in another
context a distinction between road maintenance and improvement with respect to the Association
where none exists anywhere else in the CC&Rs". R. Vol. III, p.524. This ruling is error as a
matter of law. The Court was required under G&G, Inc., Pinehaven, Cool, and Shawver v.
Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 93 P.3d 684 (2004), to determine whether the
Covenants on their face can be interpreted by giving the words or phrases used their ordinary

15

usage or a legal definition by their use
U'-'\>LU"lvU

the Covenants themselves. The

to
to enter Summary

3.

of Appellants.

Respondent's Legal Authority

Respondent's Brief argues that "none of the authority cited by the property owners
supports their contention, while the weight of the authority suggests the opposite", in discussing
definitions of maintenance versus improvement In truth, the Respondent does not provide any
applicable Idaho authority to support their contention.
In response to Appellants' citation to the Idaho Sales and Use Tax Regulations which
defines a road paving as "improving real property", Respondent argues that this provision says
nothing about "whether road paving qualifies as maintenance". Respondent's Brief, p.14. While
Respondent is correct, Respondent misses the point, which is that in the context of Idaho Sales
and Use Tax Regulations, paving is considered an improvement and a paving contractor is one
engaging in the act of improving real property. LD.A.P.A. 35.01.02.013
Similarly, the Respondent is dismissive of the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis of paving
as an improvement in Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwin Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600,338
P.3d 1204 (2014). Respondent argues that Hap Taylor turned on the definitions of structure or
improvement as found in Idaho Code§ 45-501. While true, the distinction does not negate the
Court's analysis that the act of paving roads results in a constructing a structure and that paving
constitutes an improvement. The analysis is helpful in this case to determine the intent of the
CC&Rs, which clearly limits the scope of the Association's power to that of maintenance versus
improvement.

16

act
that
Responden t's Brief, p.15. The Phase I Owner's Association argues that maintenanc e is
"unavoidab ly a specie of improveme nt" and that it is "merely a series of temporary
improveme nts".
To support both assertions, Responden t proffers absolutely no Idaho case law or statutory
authority. Instead, Idaho case law repeatedly refutes the Responden t's position. See: Byrns v.
Citv of Moscow, 121 P. 1034, 1036 (1912)[The City's act of paying for improveme nts such as
paving appropriate .]; Cole v. City of Lewiston, 295 P. 430 (l 930)[paving is within improveme nt
district jurisdiction ]; Amsbary v. City of Twin Falls, 200 P. 723 (l 921)[LID for paving is an
improveme nt.] Idaho Code§ 45-501 (2015) [person who levels surfaces or otherwise improves
land or furnishes materials is entitled to lien]; McEwen v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 132 P. 308
(1913) [city ordinance to grade and pave streets and levy assessment s constitutes an
improveme nt].
The Responden t asserts Floyd v. Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863 (2002)
for the "holding" that improveme nts include maintenanc e. There, the court was asked to
determine whether the road in question had acquired its public highway status under Idaho Code

§ 40-202 through prescriptive public use and maintenanc e or improveme nt at public expense.
The elements thereof require a showing that the road has been (1) subject to public use for a
period of five ( 5) years or more and (2) that the "road is worked and kept up at the expense of the
public". I.C. § 40-202(3). In summarizin g the trial testimony fulfilling the second
the "road was worked and kept up" at public expense, the Court noted the testimony of

that

as
portions of the road.
First, it strains credibility to extrapolate a "holding" from

Court's recitation of trial

"worked and kept up at public expense" element of

§ 40-202, such

that "maintenance is the same as improvement". "Worked and kept up" as found in the statute
and as applied in Idaho case law does indeed include both improvements and maintenance, but
never equates the two terms. The statutory language "worked and kept up" and case law
construing the statute include instances of both maintenance and improvement at public expense,
supporting Appellants' position that the terms are distinct.
Next, the Respondent argues Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311,341 P.2d 432 (1959), and
an internal quote from the Washington Supreme Court. The Idaho case of Rich addresses
constitutionality of using highway user revenue (dedicated to highways) for constructing a
highways department and department of law enforcement administration building. From this the
Court analyzed neighboring state law on the scope or breadth of the department's authority to
appropriate and use taxpayer funds. The Idaho Court quotes King Countv v. Merle, 199 Wash.
685, 93 P.2d 304, 307 (1939) for the holding that in determining scope of state highway use of
dedicated highway funds under Washington's definition of "maintenance" of public roads.
The context of Rich v. Williams is dissimilar to the case now before this Court. Further,
the quote adopted by Respondent is one from the state of Washington and certainly not binding
Idaho law (if still good law in Washington nearly eighty (80) years
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case
to

act

case is indeed still good law nearly 150 years later, it most certainly is not good law

the state

of Idaho.
Lastly, Responden t cites this Court to Utah Code

of an improvement project

for the premise that resurfacing of the road, including paving, constitutes an act of maintenance.
As discussed above, Idaho case law is well established for the premise that in the context
local improveme nt districts or city ordinances, paving a road does, in fact, constitute
improvement.
There is no need to scour obscure and antiquated references in Washington, Connecticut
and Utah when Idaho statutory and case law is well settled on this issue.
last and final argument proffered by Responden t is that the act of paving must be
equal to maintenanc e because Phase I roads were "dusty a11d bumpy" and the "cost to maintain
the gravel surface had risen to become unreasonable and paving would benefit all properties."
Responden t's Brief, p.17.
Responden t's argument seems to be if the parties are "benefitted", as interpreted by one
of the parties, then the Court may disregard the terms

the operative documents, even despite

the express limitations. Idaho case law and the facts herein do not support the Responden t's
position.
The record actually refutes Responden t's position. The Association board members and
road improvement committee sent out notice of a
that

were

road"

WOUld be an
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road which
was

Vol. I, p.1

new
1
Following the July 24th meeting from which Appellants were excluded from participation

a.11d voting, the Association board communicated that

road paving improvement had been

passed and demanded payment from the property owners describing the anticipated road paving
as a "tremendous improvement to our subdivision". R. Vol. I, p.155. [emphasis added]. The
Association knew well that the paving assessment was an improvement to the road, not merely
maintenance within the scope of its authority.
For the reasons set forth in Appellants' opening Brief and herein, the Trial Court's failure
to distinguish between improvements and maintenance and failure to enforce the limitations of
the Phase II CC&Rs restricting the Association to maintenance powers is error and must be
reversed and remanded with instructions to enter Summary Judgment in

D.

of the Appellants.

The Phase I Owner's Association's assessments and liens exceeded their
authority.

Respondent asserts that the assessment and liens were properly levied upon Appellants.
This is incorrect as the recorded covenants limit the Phase I Owner's Association's powers and
they exceeded their corporate authority.
1.

Covenants limit Association Powers.

As a matter of Law (LC.§ 45-810), the Association's power to assess Phase II owners is
limited to that expressed in the recorded Phase II CC&R's. Those powers are limited in scope to
that "pertaining directly to the maintenance of roads that the CC&R's for Phase I, recorded as
Instrument No. 449457 ... require the Association to maintain." Other than this limited power,
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II
The Phase I CC&R's referenced in Phase II CC&R's §2.03, also only empower the Phase
I Owner's Association to assess for "maintenance and repair of the private road(s) and/or
... reconstruction of any portion or portions of the private road(s), damaged or destroyed ... ".
Phase I CC&R's §2.04(d).
The Association exceeded its limited authority under both CC&Rs

2.

By-laws entitle Phase II owners to vote.

As stated in Appellants' opening brief, the by-laws of the Association provide that the
Phase II Owners "shall be entitled to cast votes on the following matters:

b. Amendment of these by-laws;
c. Questions which relate directly to the common access road
through Phase I property, and across property currently owned by
the City of Sandpoint, which common access roadway the
Association has authority and responsibility to maintain; and,
d. Assessments, so long as the assessments in question are
proposed to be a charge against the member casting the vote.
Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes
filed February 24, 2014,
5, pp. 4-5, § 3.02.l
The Phase I Owner's Association relied upon §4.04 Enforcement of Assessment/Lien, to
justify the decision not allowing Appellants to vote. However, §3.0 makes clear that Phase II
owner's rights to vote are unabridged when it concerns bylaws amendments, questions relating to
the common access road, and assessments

which they might be charged. This case involves
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or

vote was

extent

voting.

The Association could not legally amend its Bylaws so as to impose a paving
improvement as a special assessment on Phase II ownership.
The Respondent's assert that

District Court acted properly in upholding the Phase I

Owner's Association's amendment to the Bylaws to permit a "One-Time Paving Assessment".
The argument seems to be: even if the By-Laws prohibit the Association from assessing for
anything other than maintenance (Phase I CC&R's §2.04d and Phase II CC&R's §§2.03 and
2.04); and, prohibit the Association from special assessments that exceed 100% of the prior
year's annual assessment (By-laws§4.02); it is still permissible to hold a membership meeting
(excluding Phase II Owner's from voting) to pass an amendment by Phase I owner's unanimous
vote thereby amending Phase II Owner's legal interests under the Phase II CC&R's.
Prior Idaho Case Law prohibits this action by the Association. Any amendments to bylaws which deprive a member of "then-existing rights and privileges" is void as violating the
members' rights. Twin Lakes Village Property Ass'n. v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132, 135, 857 P.2nd
611,614 (1993) The Court in Twin Lakes Village noted that the amendment to bylaws, articles
of incorporation and protective covenants that eliminated certain recorded protective covenants
so as to accommodate purchase of a golf course and future development, resulted in a change to
the voting rights of members such as to fundamentally deprive the members of existing rights
and privileges as association members.
Likewise in this case, the Association's argument is that they may amend the by-laws to
accommodate their one time paving special assessment. But such assessment violated both the
letter and intent of The Phase II CC&R's thereby violating the "existing rights and privileges" of
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owners who bought with

authority

understanding that

constructive or actual

Phase II

the

special

and

assessment for road improvement deprives the Phase II O\\ners of the "existing rights and
privileges" found in the Phase II CC&R' s that which only required them to pay for maintenance
of the roads, not improvements.
Further, the Phase I Owner's Association has denied Phase II o\vners the "then-existing
rights and privileges" under the By-laws, by taking away their right to be protected from
increases in road dues exceeding the 100% of annual assessments.
Perhaps most importantly, the amendment violates the Phase II Owner's right (as
minority voters in the Phase I Owner's Association) to cast a meaningfully vote whether to be
assessed or not, on this "one-time" special assessment and all future assessments.
The result of the amendment is to impose (disproportionately) the cost of this
improvement onto the Appellants, a vote that Appellants could not successfully resist in face of
eleven (11) Phase I member votes. The Phase I Owners, as owners of smaller residential parcels,
also disproportionately benefitted from the paving adjacent to their parcels. While, the Phase II
members, as owners of larger unimproved, recreational parcels did not so benefit, but bore the
brunt of the costs (total Phase II paving assessment

$80,044.68 of $214,000.00 paving

cost). R. Vol. I, P. 158
The result of Respondent's by-laws amendment altered the Phase II CC&R's by
permitting the Association to exceed the limitations of §§2.03 and 2.04, while rendering
Appellants unable to resist the amendment in the voting process or
as originally written and recorded.

the Phase II CC&R's

II

must

matter remanded

Appellants.

Attorney's Fees
1.

District Court incorrectly awarded fees.

The District Court found the Phase I Owner Association to be the prevailing party and
awarded fees and costs pursuant to the Sections 5.03 of the CC&R's of both Phase I and IL
However, Sections 5.03 permits

award of

and costs in an action

enforcement of the

CC&R's to "the Declarant or Tract Owner". Phase I and II CC&R's §§5.03.
It was error for the Court to award fees and costs based upon the Phase I CC&R' s as they
have no bearing or encumbering power over the Phase II owners or their properties. It was also
error for the District Court to award fees and costs to the Respondent Association under the
Phase II CC&R's as the Association is neither a "Tract Owner" nor the "Declarant" as the terms
are used or defined in the covenants. Covenants are not to be extended by the Courts to include
"by implication any restriction not clearly expressed." Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 138
Idaho 826, 829, 70 P.3d 664, 667 (2003).
"Attorney fees may be awarded if authorized by statute or contract." Sherman Storage.
LLC v. Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC, 360 P.3d 340,348 (2015); quoting: Stibal v. Fano,
157 Idaho 428,435,337 P.3d 587,594 (2014).
Since the covenants do not authorize award of fees to an '"Association", only to "Tract
Owners" (Appellants) or

"Declarant" (Yellowstone Basin Properties, Inc.), it was error for

the Court to award fees to the Association on those grounds. Phase II CC&R's,
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1, ,r L

the

Section

as a

an assessment
to

for entorcement
reasonable attorney's fees, so long as the Association is

costs

prevailing party in such action."

However, as the Association was acting outside of its authority

the by-laws and recorded

Phase II CC&R' s, it cannot be a prevailing party and this Court must reverse and remand with
and costs at the trial level.

instructions to the trial Court to award Appellants their attorney's

2.

Appellants, not Respondents, are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal.
a.

Respondent's claim for fees and costs on appeal is insufficient.

Respondent simply state, vvithout analysis, that they are entitled to award of attorney's
fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code §12-121, I.R.C.P 54 (e)(l) and I.AR 41.
Respondent's Brief, P. 21.

This is insufficient to entitle Respondent's to fees and costs on

appeal.
attorney fees on appeal

"We have repeatedly held that we will not consider a request

is not supported by legal authority or argument" "Attorney fees are awardable only where
they are

240 P.3d 583,

by statute or contract".

590, 149 Idaho 737, 744 (2010); quoting: Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364,369, 79

723,

728 (2003).
In Capps as in this case, the Bank prevailed on appeal but merely cited the court to LA.R.
41 to which

Court stated: "That rule "sets forth the procedure

awarding attorney fees

appeals before this Court, but does not provide authority to award attorney fees." Capps, 149
Idaho at 744;

Swanson v. Kraft, Inc., 116 Idaho 31
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322, 775

(1989).

A citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, is
insufficient. Although MBNA cited to the above statutory fees
provisions, it submitted no argument in its brief as to why fees
21.
should be awarded under either LC.§ 12-120(3) or LC.§
Thus, we decline to award attorneys fees to MBNA on appeal.
Capps v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 240 P.3d 583,591, 149
Idaho 737, 745 (2010); quoting Carroll v. MBNl, America Bank,
148 Idaho 261,270,200 P.3d 1080, 189 (2009)
The Respondent failed to support their claim for attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

I.AR. 35(b)(5) requires the Respondent to assert their claim for attorney's fees and the basis for
such claim in Respondent's brief. Respondent failed to do so, thereby waiving such claim. The
Respondent's fees and costs may not be awarded on appeal.

b.

Appellants are entitled to fees and costs on appeal.

Unlike Respondent, Appellants did assert their right to fees and costs on appeal in
Appellants' openi11g Brief. As tract owners enforcing

Phase II CC&R' s, the Appellants are

entitled to award of fees and costs under Section 5.03. Appellants also asserted Idaho Code §12121 as basis for award of fees and costs.
An award of attorney fees under [I. C.] § 12-121 is not a matter of
right to the prevailing party." However, this Court "permits the
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the court
determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.
Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 302 P.3d 349, 356,
154 Idaho 724, 731 (2013); quoting Michalk v. Michalk,
148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 1 (2009).
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Under Idaho

§1

voting

1

Respondent's actions

and violating the express terms

matter were pursued

I

II

CC&R's and the corporate By-laws. Appellants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on
appeal and at the trial level.
Further, under Section 5.03 of the recorded Phase II CC&R's, Appellants are entitled
award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal and at the trial level.
The Court is asked to reverse and remand the District Court's Decision with instructions
awarding Appellants their fees and costs on appeal and at the trial leveL
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as set

reasons set
to reverse the

findings set forth

1S

the Memorandum ,_,,,.,..,h_,,,vu and to

remand this matter with instructions to the Trial Court to enter Judgment

favor of Appellants

and to award Appellants fees and costs at the trial level. The Court is further asked to award
Appellants' attorney's fees and cost on this appeaL
of March, 2016.

Attorney for Appellants
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